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Abstract
This study investigates how per capita calorie intake in low income households of rural south-
western Nigeria responds to changes in total household income and women’s share of household
income. The study addresses two major questions. First, is calorie-income elasticity large enough
to justify the use of income increases as a food/nutrition policy strategy for increasing calorie
intake among low income households? Second, what is the potential effect of intra-household
redistribution of income from men to women on per capita calorie consumption?  My results
show that calorie-income elasticity is small and close to zero, implying that income policies may
not be the most effective way to achieve substantial improvements in calorie consumption. I also
find that increases in women’s share of household income are likely to result in marginal
declines in per capita food calorie intake, suggesting that income redistribution from men to
women would not increase per capita food energy intake in these households.  
Key words: Nigeria, Intra-Household Redistribution of Income, Women’s Income Share
Elasticity, Income Elasticity, Calorie Consumption.
JEL Classifications: D13, I12, O15, Q18
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
A wide range of empirical literature has provided evidence that the level of per-
capita calorie intake has a strong positive but non-linear relationship with household 
income, after controlling for household and demographic variables (Bouis and Haddad, 
(1992), Subramanian and Deaton (1996), Grimard (1996)).1 Prior to 1987, calorie-income 
elasticity for low-income populations throughout the developing world was estimated to 
be between 0.4 and 0.8 (Boius et al, 1992). Thus, income increases for the poor as a food 
policy strategy have received strong justification in that it is expected to reduce 
malnutrition (Alderman, 1986).  
However, Behrman and Deolalikar (1987) analyzed ICRISAT data for India, and 
found calorie-income elasticity estimates that were not significantly different from zero. 
They concluded that the linkage between income and nutrient consumption is weak and 
that nutrient improvements should not be expected with income gains in low income 
communities.2 This result was reinforced by Bouis and Haddad (1992) who estimated 
calorie intake-total expenditure elasticity ranging between 0.08 and 0.14 with four 
different estimation techniques using a sample of Philippine farm households. Bouis et al 
(1992), argue that several studies after Behrman and Deolalikar (1987) reported calorie-
income elasticity estimates which are in most cases lower than 0.2.  
                                                          
1 The article by Bouis and Haddad (1992) presented results of 30 investigations into calorie-income 
elasticity between 1979 and 1991. The range of calorie-income elasticity estimates for those who used 
calories from food expenditures was 0.22 – 1.18, while estimates from studies that used calories from  24 
hour recall of quantity intake range between 0.01 – 0.37.  Subramanian and Deaton (1996), estimated 
calorie-total expenditure elasticity of between 0.3 and 0.5 for households in rural Maharashtra in India.  
Grimard (1996) reported the calorie-expenditure elasticity for urban Pakistan to range between 0.51 and 
0.25 from low to high-income households and 0.62 to 0.35 for the rural sector. 
 
2 This was a follow-up on Wolfe and Behrman (1983) who found calorie income elasticity in the 
neighborhood of 0.01 for household sample collected from Nicaragua.  
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This revisionist school attributed the previous high estimates of calorie-income 
elasticity to two major sources. The first source is the wide use of calories estimated from 
food expenditure data rather than direct collection of data on food intake quantities, due 
to the dearth of food quantity information in existing household surveys. The second 
source of upward bias is believed to be the endogeneity of household income in the 
calorie intake – income model.  
 The use of calorie intake quantities from food expenditure data creates two kinds 
of upward bias in the estimate of the calorie-income elasticity. The first is non-classical 
measurement error bias3 and the second is aggregation bias.4 This study addresses these 
problems by using data collected directly on actual food intake quantities to estimate the 
calorie-income elasticity.   
Upward bias in calorie-income elasticity estimate which results from endogeneity 
of household income is basically of the type known as simultaneity bias5. Another form 
                                                          
3 The non-classical measurement error bias can arise in two ways. First, when expenditure is used as a 
proxy for income (as in this paper) and calorie intake quantity data are derived from food expenditure data, 
the measurement error in both the left and right hand side of the equation are correlated. In other words, 
when calorie intake quantity is calculated as the ratio of food expenditure to the price, part of the 
measurement error in the expenditure variable (when it proxies for income) on the right hand side is carried 
over to the calorie quantity measure on the left hand side of the equation. This is called non-classical 
measurement error and results in upward bias of the income elasticity of calorie intake. Second, because 
expenditure data does not distinguish between food consumed at home and those given as gifts to the less 
privileged, calorie quantity intake for the rich is over estimated and that of the poor is underestimated. This 
results in an upward bias in calorie-income elasticity. According to Bouis (1994), failure to take accurate 
account of food transfers from the rich to the poor is a source of upward bias for calorie-income elasticity 
generated from food expenditure survey. 
 
4 Aggregation bias describes a situation in which consumers substitute more expensive and low 
concentration sources of calories in the diet for less expensive and high calorie concentration foods as 
income increases. Consequently, when food calorie intake is estimated from food expenditure survey data 
with no quantity information, this substitution effect is lost in aggregation of the two types of foods and 
results in the overestimation of calorie-income elasticity.    
 
5 This is due to the reverse causation between calorie intake and income and is based on the nutrition-
productivity hypothesis. Strauss (1986), using Sierra Leone data found a highly significant effect of calorie 
intake on labor productivity, and took this to be an evidence in support of the reverse causation hypothesis.  
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of bias that results from endogeneity of income is the omitted variable bias.6 The sign of 
this bias is however dependent the nature of relationship between income and the 
dominant source of bias.7  In this study, I adopt the instrumental variable technique to 
address this problem of endogeneity of income.   
On the other hand, the conventional school of thought which support the 
traditional view that calorie-income elasticities are sizeable at least among low income 
households argue that recent low estimates of calorie-income elasticity in households 
could arise from two sources. First is the frequent use of current income as a measure of 
wealth rather than permanent income (Behrman and Deolalikar, 1990)8, while the second 
is measurement error in income and expenditure. A major problem associated with data 
collected in developing countries is the difficulty in obtaining accurate data on income 
and expenditure.9 Both the use of current income and measurement error in the data 
                                                          
6 This bias arises because labor income is a choice variable in the household decision model that allows for 
labor supply/leisure choices.  If both labor supply and consumption decisions are driven by same 
unobserved factor such as ‘taste for work’, then some proportion of the estimated effect of income on 
calorie intake may be the result of spurious correlations between calorie intake and income rather than the 
evidence of a causative effect from income to calorie intake.  
 
7 For example, Wolfe and Behrman (1983) attributed the higher estimate of calorie income elasticities in 
rural relative to urban areas obtained by Ward and Sanders (1980) to the fact that omitted price variables 
are likely to be correlated with the location variable, resulting in an upward bias of the rural calorie income 
elasticity.  
 
8 The reasons for this are twofold: First, current income is a very noisy measure of the wealth flow into a 
household and this enlarges the value in the denominator of the regression coefficient estimator.  Second, 
the covariance between current income and food consumption is believed to be lower than that between 
permanent income and food consumption (permanent income hypothesis). Thus if current income is used, 
the numerator of the regression coefficient estimator is understated.  The interaction of these two effects 
would lead to a downward bias in the estimate of the regression coefficient of income in the food calorie 
intake equation.   
 
9 Two major reasons for this are: the disproportionately large informal sector with little or no formal 
income records, and the general view that detailed information on personal income is private and that this 
privacy should be protected from second parties including members of the same household.  
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would bias the ordinary least square regression estimate of the calorie-income elasticity 
downwards. 10 
 Per-capita expenditure is therefore used in place of current income in this study 
since it is a better proxy for permanent income.  Furthermore, the use of per capita 
expenditure as proxy for income reduces measurement error in income since it is easier to 
get information on expenditures than on income in developing countries. To further 
reduce the magnitude of error, I used income, expenditure and daily calorie intake values 
which are averages over 12 fortnightly visits to each sample household.   
The second point of investigation in this study is the effect of women’s share of 
income on calorie intake in low income households. Studies that investigate the effect of 
variation in household resource control pattern on household investment and 
consumption patterns in developing countries are not common, due to the dearth of 
gender disaggregated household level information on income, expenditure and 
consumption. No such study is available for Nigeria. 
Hopkins et al (1994) found that in Niger that changes in female annual income, 
while controlling for male income impacted positively on household food expenditures. 
These results, they claim, hold for both earned and non-labor income.  Hoddinott and 
Haddad (1995), using data from Cote De ‘Ivoire found a positive but small marginal 
effect of women’s income share on household food budget share. A doubling of the 
proportion of household cash income received by wives would lead to a meagre 1.9 % 
rise in budget share of food eaten within the household. Thomas (1997) on the other hand 
found in his analysis of Brazilian data that the marginal effect of increasing women’s 
income on food expenditure share is negative and higher than the marginal effect of 
                                                          
10 This bias is called the classical measurement error bias or attenuation bias.  
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husband’s income.  He also found that  household food calorie intake, protein intake, 
height-for-age and weight-for-height of children  intake responds more positively to 
increases in women’s income than to increases in husband’s income. He concludes that 
the identity of the identity of the household member controlling income (non-labor or 
total) affects calorie intake, protein intake, height-for-age of children, and weight-for-
height of children. 
On the whole, the observed impact of women’s income share on household 
consumption and investment patterns is thought to be a reflection of gender differentiated 
preferences.  The analysis in this paper in based on household consumption, income, and 
expenditure data disaggregated by gender and thus gives us a rare opportunity to examine 
the effect of variation resource control pattern on per capita calorie intake. This paper 
hopes to contribute to the growing literature on determinants of calorie intake at the 
household level by investigating the response of calorie intake of individuals in the 
household to increases in both per capita expenditure and the share of household income 
controlled by women. The model estimated in this paper also allows for differential 
income responses for individuals, taking account of the effect of age and sex11.  
The major findings of this study are as follows. First, expenditure elasticity of per 
capita calorie intake is estimated to be between 0.00 and 4.00 percent, suggesting that 
calorie intake does not get a substantial share of marginal increases in household income. 
Thus, increasing household disposable income may not be a very effective strategy for 
bringing about increased food energy intake among low income populations in Nigeria.  
                                                          
11 Behrman and Deolalikar (1990) observed that not many existing studies have used individual level data 
to examine calorie- income response relationships as used in this paper. (Behrman and Deolalikar , 1990)  
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Second, we find some support for the Engel proposition that expenditure elasticity 
varies inversely with income level, in the ordinary least square estimate of the calorie-
expenditure function. Log per capita expenditure entering either singly or in conjunction 
with its quadratic term was not statistically significant under the Instrumental variable 
two stage least square technique. (IV-2SLS) 
Third, I estimate women’s share of income elasticity of per capita calorie intake to 
be between -0.02 and –0.05 and show that this negative marginal response is neither a 
consequence  reallocation of income towards more expensive and low calorie food 
sources nor an evidence of positive transaction cost resulting from imperfect substitution 
between male and female income in food consumption.  This estimate is a rejection of the 
hypothesis that per capita calorie intake is positively related to increasing women’s share 
of household income and suggests that wealth redistribution from men to women would 
not increase per capita food energy intake in low income households in rural south 
western Nigeria.    
Finally, it is observed that the OLS and 2SLS estimates of women share of 
income are both negative, showing some consistency in the sign attached to the 
coefficient of women’s income share variable irrespective of type of estimator (i.e. OLS 
or 2SLS).  
 2.0  IMPORTANCE OF FOOD CALORIE INTAKE 
Economic analysis of calorie consumption by households derives from the 
important role calories play in the definition of important welfare concepts such as health 
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and labor productivity12. According to Maxwell and Frankeberger (1992), enough food is 
mostly defined with emphasis on calorie and on requirements for an active, healthy life 
rather than simple survival. 13 
Food calorie intake has been found to have a strong empirical linkage with both 
human health and productivity. The human body needs energy to maintain normal body 
function (basic metabolic rate), engage in required minimal activity related to good health 
and hygiene (standard minimum requirement), and carry out productive activities to 
sustain the supply of energy and other required nutrients to the body.  The level of calorie 
intake (both stock and flow) by an individual should therefore be adequate to sustain 
these functions over his expected lifetime.  When this lifetime calorie consumption 
pattern falls short of a minimum threshold, the individual is at a health risk. Secondly 
whenever there is a persistent short fall in the flow of calorie intake relative to the amount 
required for optimal productive activity, the inflow of other nutrient intakes is likely to be 
affected since the resources required to acquire these nutrients is obtained from 
productive work. This situation is especially true in populations where the major income-
earning asset is human labor efforts, as is investigated in this study. That is, populations 
made up of poor households where non-earned income forms an insignificant component 
of full income. In such populations, increased calorie intake may imply increased 
productivity, increased income and thus improved overall nutrition.14 Increased nutrition 
                                                          
12 See Stiglitz (1976) for a detailed discussion of the efficiency wage hypothesis which provides the 
theoretical framework for understanding the link between productivity and calorie intake. 
  
13 Food energy requirements are often used as proxy for all nutritional requirements, even though adequacy 
in calories may occur simultaneously with serious deficiencies in other nutrients.  
 
14 Using household level data from Sierra Leone, Strauss (1986) found highly significant effect of calorie 
intake on labor productivity. 
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is associated with sustained increments in productivity and thus sustained access to food 
energy intake.    
3.0 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The analysis in this paper is approached from the point of view of a cooperative 
bargaining household model. There are two general classes of household models namely: 
income pooling and bargaining models. The income pooling models assume that 
household demand (or expenditure share) is not affected by the identity of the individual 
that earns the income. The effective constraint on the household welfare function is the 
pooled household income. On the other hand, the bargaining model throws away the 
income pooling assumption of the income pooling models and allows for the explicit 
effect of distributional factors on demand or expenditure share.  
Income pooling models are of two types – unitary or common preference models 
and collective or individual preference models of the household. The unitary model 
(which is a restricted form of income pooling models) assumes that the preferences of 
household members are uniform or that the preference of just one household member (the 
household head or dictator) is imposed on all other members. The unitary household thus 
maximizes a welfare function whose only component is the utility function of the dictator 
or household head. On the other hand, the collective model allows for a more general 
formulation of the household welfare function while still accommodating income the 
pooling restriction. Unlike in the unitary model, it allows for differences in preferences 
between actors within the household.  
In the set of collective or individual preference models, household welfare 
function is defined as: 
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 I 
Uh   =   Σ  Φi  Ui ;  i  = 1 …….I       (3.1)  
i=1    
 
and  Φi  =  K  
 
where Uh   is the household welfare function,  Ui  is individual i’s utility function 
in a household with I individuals. Φi is the welfare or Pareto weight attached to the utility 
function of each individual I and K is a vector of constants with i elements whose values 
range between 0 and 1. By characterization of this model, Φi is fixed and does not change 
with changes in factors that affect resource control power (also called distributional 
factors) within the household such as individual income, assets, and schooling. Thus, 
changes in distributional factors do not affect the relative expenditure share on goods in a 
collective model. It is assumed that Φi   is set from marriage and does not change 
throughout the life time of the household. So the collective model results in a demand 
system derived from a Pareto optimal allocation with a fixed Φi vector. There is no 
movement along the utility possibility frontier of the household, since only one point on 
the contract curve is relevant.15 The predictions of the collective model is that income 
changes only affect household demand directly through the Slutsky income effect and not 
through the power sharing factor in the household welfare function. The unitary model is 
a special case of the collective model where Φi  = [1,0], given that i = 2. 
The second broad class of household models is the non-income pooling or 
bargaining model. This is the model that is assumed for the analysis carried out in this 
paper. The bargaining model jettison the income pooling assumption of the collective 
model and allows for the explicit effect of distributional factors on household demand or 
                                                          
15 The contract curve is a locus of Pareto optimal allocations for the household. 
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expenditure levels. The model specifically assumes that Φi ≠  [1, 0] and that Φi ≠  K. 
Thus, the whole range of utility possibility frontier is the set of feasible Pareto optimal 
allocations for the decision making environment characterized by bargaining. In this 
model, changes in power sharing or distributional factors are expected to lead to changes 
in Φi and the changes in Φi are in turn expected to result in changing demand pattern or 
expenditure shares. Thus, the bargaining model predicts that income changes affect 
demand both directly (through the Slutsky income effect) and indirectly (through the 
power sharing factor, Φi ).  
Assume that a household in this study is made up of a man (m), a woman (f), and 
others members who are non-income earners (c); individuals in the household have 
differentiated preferences; and household income is not pooled. Suppose that the each 
individual in the household derive utility from two composite good: calorie/energy 
producing good, C, and non-calorie producing goods, Q. Calorie itself cannot be 
purchased but its intake depends on the amount of food item Xj consumed. The amount of 
food item, Xj, consumed in turn depends on its price, Pj, and a number of tastes factors 
such as characteristics of the individual (γi) and household level characteristics (γh).  We 
assume that the pareto/welfare weights of the man, Φm , and the woman, Φf , sum to unity, 
implying that other members of the household, (c), who have no bargaining power have 
pareto weights Φc  = 0. Also the household income, Yh, is the sum of the individual 
incomes of the man, Ym, and the woman, Yf. Given a particular level of household 
income, higher levels of Yf would imply higher bargaining power for the woman or 
higher Φf. Thus Φf is a function of the distributional /power sharing factor   Yf/Yh.  
The household solves the maximization problem stated in expressions 3.2 to 3.7:  
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Yh = pjXj + Q        (3.3) 
 
Yh = Ym + Yf        (3.4) 
 
C = C ( Xj,  γi, γh )         (3.5) 
 
Φi  ≠  K; where K is a constant and i = (m, f)    (3.6) 
 
Φf = Φf (Yf /Yh), and Φm = (1- Φf )     (3.7). 
 
From this constrained maximization problem, we derive an optimal demand 
function for calorie intake as a function of prices, household income, a power sharing  or 
distributional factor, individual and household level  characteristics. Formally, 
C = C (Xj(p), Yh, Φf (Yf /Yh), γi, γh)       (3.8) 
4.0  DATA 
4.1 Data Collection Procedure 
Three states were selected out of the six states in South-western Nigeria.  The 
three states selected are Ogun representing the Lagos/Ogun group; Oyo representing the 
Oyo/Osun group and Ondo representing the Ekiti/Ondo group.  Historically, the three 
groups are more homogeneous within than between in terms of culture and tradition. 
Four rural local government areas were selected in each of Ogun, Ondo and Oyo 
states. There are 3 main geopolitical divisions in each state called Senatorial Districts. 
Each senatorial district is in turn made up of Local Government Areas (LGAs). At least 
one L.G.A. was selected from the list of rural LGAs in each of the 3 senatorial districts in 
each state. The Headquarters of the selected rural local government areas were 
automatically selected for the survey.  The headquarters were selected since the 
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population in the headquarters is assumed to represent the best mix of the dwellers in the 
L.G.A.  It will also allow the sampled households to exhibit enough variability in the 
major variables of concern in the study. A total of 12 LGAs were selected in all. The 
selected local government areas are as shown in Table 1. They are, Egbado-North, 
Obafemi-Owode, Remo-North and Ijebu-East from Ogun State; Ibarapa-North, Itesiwaju, 
Surulere and Saki-East from Oyo; and, Irele, Ondo-East, Akure-North and Akoko-North-
West from Ondo State. All the selected local government headquarters can be classified 
either rural or semi-urban.  None can be classified as urban. 
 A combination of cluster and systematic random sampling was used to select 40 
households from each of the selected 12 rural/semi-urban communities. Thus, a total of 
160 households per state and 480 households in all were selected.16 However, the 
analysis used information from only 472 households, amounting to 2573 individuals who 
                                                          
16 One major requirement for the choice of Field Assistants for was that they must have been resident in the 
community for an appreciably long time and must be acceptable to the people. Before the commencement 
of operations in each LGA, the local government office, Traditional Rulers, and other popular community 
leaders were contacted for official permission and moral support during the period of the study. They were 
in the process intimated with the importance of the study. Letters of recommendation were obtained from 
the council office to give official backing to the study.  Each selected community was divided into 4 
clusters. Each cluster consisted of residential areas nearest to one another. From the list of major residential 
areas under each of the 4 clusters, one area is chosen by a simple random procedure. The lists of streets 
under each of the 4 selected residential areas were compiled and 2 streets were chosen by simple random 
sampling procedure. 5 houses were chosen from each of the 2 streets selected from each area.  This was 
done by a systematic random sampling, using the random number table. A listing of the houses in the 
selected streets was made to get the approximate number of houses in the street. Let us assume that the 
number of the houses listed in the street is 50 houses and we want to pick 2 houses in the street. Our 
population (N) = 50 and our sample size (n) = 2. We calculate a sampling interval (S.I ) of 25 through the 
formula:  S.I. = N/n = 50/2 = 25.  The random number table (RNT) was then used to get the random start 
(R.S). Random start (R.S.) is the first house to be picked in the community.  The R.S. must not be greater 
than the S.I.  It is either less than or equal to the S.I. 5 houses were chosen at the interval of the sample 
interval (S.I), 25. The 5 houses selected through the systematic procedure were then visited to make a list of 
the number of households. One household is then chosen by a simple random procedure if more than one 
household dwell in a selected housing unit. The total number of households selected was thus 10 for each 
of 4 areas, in each of 4 communities, in each of 3 States. The researchers then called on the head of the 
chosen household to introduce themselves and seek permission to conduct the study for six months.  Efforts 
were made to obtain the full permission of the household head and cooperation of all household members. 
The list of the consenting households was subsequently made. (see Aromolaran, 2001.)  
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are at least 2 years of age (See Table 1).17 The needed information was collected through 
the use of interview schedules/questionnaires that were personally administered by the 
field assistants and field supervisors. Food price data were obtained through community 
market surveys. 18 
Food consumption information was collected on individual basis from the 
households. Quantities of daily food intake were collected for each member of the 
household, using a 48-hour recall method.19  Each household was visited at least once in 
two weeks. Data were collected over a period of 6 months (October 1999 – March 2000). 
Thus daily food intake quantities for each individual in the household were collected two 
times every month for a total of twelve times in 6 months.  The analysis reported here 
was based on per capita daily food consumption averaged over the 6 months of data 
collection. This is designed to reduce measurement error in food consumption by 
smoothening day-to-day fluctuations in food intake. These quantities were then converted 
into kilogram units. The daily calorie intake level of the individual Ci , was computed 
through the formula: 
               m   
   Ci = Σ ωj Fij       (4.1)  
             
j = 1  
 
                                                          
17 Children below 2 years were not considered in the analysis because many of them were still being breast-
fed. 
 
18 Consequently, food prices only vary across the 12 local government areas. 
 
19 Individuals were asked about the amount of food they consumed in the last 24 hours, and then in the 
preceding 24 hours. There was no direct weighing of food quantities. The method used to obtain the 
measure of food quantities was indirect. A standard size of each major food item was prepared and weighed 
at the research office. These physical measures were taken as the unit of measurement on the field.  Each 
survey personnel carried the physical measures with them and used them to assist the individuals in 
assessing the quantities of food items taken in the past 48 hours. For example, if one respondent says he 
consumed twice the field unit for a particular food item, then his intake of that item in kilograms will be the 
weight of the standardized field unit multiplied by 2.  
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Where: Fij is the weight in grams of the average daily intake of food commodity j 
by individual i.  ωj is the standard measure of calorie found in each type of food 
commodity Fj .  A total of 46 food items that were considered common food items in the 
area constituted our basket of food.20 (i.e J=46). 
Income from different occupational sources was obtained on a fortnightly basis 
for a period of six months. No distinction was made between labor and non-labor income 
in the computation of the income variable used in this analysis 21 and all income data 
were collected from each income-earning members of the household. Expenditure 
information by item was also collected every two weeks for each income-earning 
member of the household.22  
4.2  Food Consumption Pattern and Calorie Intake in South Western Nigeria 
 
According to FAO (1985), food consumption pattern is measured by the share of 
dietary energy supplies contributed by each major food group. The analysis under this 
subsection involved the computation of the percentage contribution of each major food 
group in the food basket of the households in the study area to total calorie intake. It 
                                                          
20 The food items include  Yam, Pounded Yam,  Asaro (Mashed Yam Meal), Amala Isu (Dried Yam 
Dough) , Gari (fried fermented cassava granules), Eba (dough made from Gari),  Fufu (Wet Cassava Flour 
Dough),  Amala Lafun (dried cassava flour dough),  Boiled Beans,  Moinmoin ( boiled bean dough)  Akara 
( fried bean dough) , Boiled Rice, Ogi ( Liquid Maize Pap), Eko ( Solid Maize Pap) , Boiled Maize,  
Potatoes,  Butter, Milk,   Tea/coffee,  Sugar,  Beverages (e.g.Bournvita, Milo)  Plantain/Dodo,  Bread,  
Biscuit/snacks, Vegetables, Pomo (Cow Skin),  Beef ,  Pork,  Sheep/Goat Meat, Chicken, Eggs, Fish, 
Orange, Pawpaw, Banana, Vegetable,Oil , Pepper/Tomato, Palm Oil,  Gari,  Cocoyam,  Melon, Okro, 
Groundnut, Cray Fish, Snail,  Games (Bush Meat), Elubo Isu  (yam flour). 
 
21 Given the possibility of reverse causality between calorie intake and labor income, the use of non-labor 
income instead of the sum of both labor and non-labor income on the right hand side would have been a 
good idea. However, this could not be done in this case because of non-availability of separate useable data 
on non-labor income. 
 
22 This implies that all consumption expenditures in the household were fully assigned to income earning 
members. For example if a teenage daughter  who earns no income bought some cloths, the amount spent 
on the cloths is assigned to the income earning household member who transferred the amount to her.  
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shows the importance of each food item in the food calorie basket of the average 
individual in the study area. 
Table 2 reveals that food consumption pattern is essentially the same among 
males and females, with roots and tubers supplying close to 60 percent of calorie intake.23  
Cereals provide only 17 percent of calorie intake while legumes contribute 7 percent. 
Less than 3 percent of energy intake comes from animal products, while oils and fats 
provide 10-11 percent.  This food consumption pattern is a fair reflection of the farming 
patterns in the study area since roots and tubers are the dominant food crops followed by 
cereals and oil palm. The finding that low quality high carbohydrate foods are the major 
source of calories is an indication that adequate calorie intake may not imply adequate 
intake of other nutrients in the study area.   
Table 3 shows that adults get a greater proportion of their calorie intakes from 
cereals, legumes and animal products than children do. On the other hand, children below 
the age of 6 years get 60 percent of the energy intake from roots and tubers alone, while 
adults get about 53 percent. Thus, children below the age of 10 years obtain 
proportionately more calories from low quality foods than adults.  This has important 
implications for child welfare. 
Table 4 shows that age is a very important determinant of the level of calorie 
intake. For both males and females average daily calorie intake increases with age. 
Secondly, children and adolescents, particularly males, do not consume enough calories 
to meet their daily minimum energy requirements. Even though, in absolute terms, males 
consume slightly more calories than females, calorie intake deficiency is more profound 
                                                          
23 Roots and tubers are high carbohydrate foods which contain insignificant amounts of other nutrients 
apart from calories. 
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among males than females because of the lower minimum energy requirement by 
females. 
 The numbers in the first panel of Table 5 imply that per-capita daily calorie 
intake does not vary with formal educational status of household head, while the second 
panel shows that calorie intake  is higher across age groups for individuals in households 
whose major source of income are the food sector compared with households who obtain 
most of their incomes from non-food related sources.  
4.3  Socio-economic Characteristics of Households 
From Table 6, we observe that average calorie intake per capita is 2204 
kilocalories and note that this is below the 2500 kcal recommended by FAO as standard 
minimum daily requirement. This shortfall of 13.4 percent substantially understates the 
energy deficiency problem given the fact that poor families generated virtually all their 
incomes through direct labor efforts. Per capita consumption expenditure is estimated as 
2135 Naira per month (or $US26).24  Furthermore it is estimated that 57.4 percent of total 
value of food consumed at home is purchased from the market. The implicit cost of 1000 
units of calories is 28.8 Naira ($0.36). Total asset possessed by the average household is 
valued as 810,506 Naira (or $US10,131), with a median value of 342,570 Naira ($4280).   
The average household size in the sample consists of 7 persons. 12 percent of 
household heads and 8 percent of senior wives have some tertiary education, while 44 
percent of household heads and 48 percent of senior wives have no formal education. The 
average husband in the study area has 5.1 years of schooling while the average senior 
                                                          
24 The public service minimum wage at the time of data collection was 3000 Naira. 
 
 17
wife has 4.3 years of schooling. Thus the ratio of years of schooling of wife to the 
husband in the average household is 0.80.  
Table 2 further shows that women’s share of household income is about 0.353 and 
women’s share of total household food expenditure is 0.321 percent. We also observe 
that the food share in total women’s consumption expenditure is 0.32, indicating that 
women spend more of their income on non-food consumption items. 25  Women’s share 
of own-farm produce consumed at home is 0.0736, showing that men supply most of the 
farm produce consumed at home. Women’s ownership share of total acreage farmed is 
only 0.144.26  Furthermore, while women’s share of total farmland value is just 7 percent, 
women’s share of business assets is about 0.304, implying a lower involvement of 
women in farming compared with non-farm businesses. This is supported by the fact that 
while 59 percent of household heads earn their income mainly from non-farm sources; 70 
percent of senior wives earn their income mainly from this source. 27 
                                                          
25  Incomes earned were recorded separately for men and women. Expenditures made by men and women 
were also recorded separately. Both income and expenditure measures included farm produce consumed at 
home. Home production of non-marketable goods and services are not accounted for as a form of income 
and expenditure. This would certainly understate the full income of the household and may understate the 
income of wives relative to husbands.   To avoid double counting, only expenditures made from own-
income were recorded for an individual.  For example a woman may expend 100 units of money on 
consumption during the month. If 80 percent of it were transfers from her husband, then her own 
expenditure is just 20 units of money.   
 
26 Not all plots are individually owned, since we have both individual and family farms. Yet all plots could 
be easily assigned to either the husband or the wife. All family farms are assigned to the household head 
(who are in 88% of the time males). This is because the men fully control the incomes and expenditure 
from these farms. Plots assigned to women are those that belong solely to the women; plots upon which 
they exercise a dominating control over income and expenditure patterns. 
 
27 About 23 percent of household heads and 9 percent of senior wives are wage earners. 
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5.0  EMPIRICAL MODEL  
The major hypotheses to be tested by the empirical model specified here are that: 
• Increases in household income would increase per-capita calorie intake in 
low income rural households in south western Nigeria. 
• Increases in women income conditional on total household income would 
increase per-capita calorie intake in rural south western Nigeria. 
 The structural form equation derived from the individual preference model 
adopted as framework for this study is represented as   




C is natural log of individual or per capita daily calorie intake (Kilocalories).   
X is log of per-capita consumption expenditure (Proxy for income). 
W is women share of household gross income (range 0-1) 28 
I is the vector of individual level variables (age, sex etc)  
H is the vector of household level variables (household composition variables, 
household’s major income source)29 
P is the vector of prices per kilogram in Naira of 10 food items that make up 95% of the 
sources of calorie intake in the study area.30  
                                                          
28 The women share of income is calculated as income earned by women in the household divided by 
incomes earned by the sum of incomes earned by men and women in the household. 
 
29 An important component of this household characteristics vector is the indicator variable for major 
source of household income or occupation of household head; 0 if farming and 1 if non-farming. This 
variable controls for unobserved heterogeneous consumption preferences which are either due to taste 
factors or prices. For example, farming households may prefer different kinds of food to non-farming 
household just because of the differences in labor energy needs.  Secondly, farming households would want 
to consume products from their farms more than those purchased from the market because of the relatively 
cheaper cost of food obtained from own farm.   
 
30 The food items are yam, yam flour, cassava flour, cowpeas (beans), gari, rice, maize, palm oil, fish, and 
beef ( see Table 2. The price vector used here consists of community market averages rather than 
household specific prices. This is because household specific prices may not be exogenous since variations 
in household-specific prices may be the result of measurement error and heterogeneity in quality choices. 
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ε   is the disturbance or error term . 
The two major parameters of interest in this study are α1 and α2. The former is the 
expenditure/income elasticity of per capita calorie intake while the later represent the 
marginal response of calorie intake to increases in the share of household income that is 
under the control of women. Based on evidence from empirical literature, we expect a 
positive α1 with values ranging between 0.00 and 0.40.  A non-linear specification of per-
capita expenditure is generally accepted in both theoretical and empirical literature on 
calorie-income elasticity estimation. Since a log-linear specification of per capita 
expenditure would restrict the elasticity coefficient to be constant across income levels 
and theory suggests that this elasticity is likely to decline as income level increases (ie. 
that income/expenditure elasticity is an inverse function of income level), I estimate an 
alternative specification for which per capita expenditure is specified as a quadratic 
form.31  
A positive α2 would imply that a redistribution household income from men to 
women would result in increased per capita daily calorie intake in the household.  A 
negative α2 would imply that the redistribution of income from men to women 
(conditional on household income) would reduce per capita daily calorie intake and 
would suggest that more income in the hands of women relative to men may not be a 
effective strategy for increasing per capita daily calorie intake in the household. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
To address this problem, Thomas (1997) used average market prices for 12 community groups. Ravillion 
(1990) on the other hand used average prices across households for the same district to reduce the bias due 
to household differences in taste for quality.  
 
31 Nutrition studies that use log-linear relationships assume constant elasticity. Many studies have however 
used forms that permit variable elasticities (e.g. Pitt,1984, Strauss 1984, Strauss 1990, Berman and Wolfe, 
1984, Timmer and Alderman, 1979). Timmer and Alderman (1979) particularly found quadratic 
specification to have the best fit out of all the different forms of Engel specification that was tried. Engel 
specification implies that income elasticity or expenditure elasticity declines with income level.  
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6.0  ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION ISSUES 
Estimating equation (5.1) by the ordinary least square (OLS) regression procedure 
would imply an assumption that all the right hand side variables in the model are truly 
exogenous.32 This may not be the case in this model with income and expenditure 
variables on the right hand side. Women’s share of income is endogenous because the 
income variable used in this model is basically labor income, making its value an 
outcome of labor supply choices. The bias introduced into an OLS estimate of such 
elasticity coefficient is called omitted variable bias.33  
There is also the problem of simultaneity which is due to the possibility of reverse 
causality between calorie intake and income.34  This relationship is the central theme of 
the efficiency wage hypothesis (see Stiglitz, 1976). It proposes that higher income 
earning opportunities are open to those who are better nourished.  However, Subramanian 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
32 That is if  µ, υ and ε  are the error terms in per capita expenditure, women income share and per capita 
calorie intake equations, the following conditions must hold for per capita expenditure and women share of 
income to be truly exogenous in the calorie intake model:  E(X µ) = 0 ; E(W υ ) = 0; where E implies 
mathematical expectation.     
 
33 This bias arises because labor income is a choice variable in the household decision model that allows for 
labor supply/leisure choices.  If both labor supply and consumption decisions are driven by same 
unobserved factor such as ‘taste for work’, then some proportion of the  estimated effect of income on 
calorie intake may be the result of spurious correlations between calorie intake and income rather than the 
evidence of a causative effect from income to calorie intake. the direction of the bias would depend on the 
exact direction of the relationship of the dominant source of bias to the endogenous left hand side  and right 
hand side  variables. 
 
34 One reason why it is difficult to assume at the onset of analysis that income and expenditure are 
exogenously determined in this study is that there exist a large amount of literature on farm household 
models which argue that if markets are incomplete, the production and consumption decisions of farm 
households are not separable and labor productivity/farm income is likely to depend on food consumption 
(see Udry, 199).  If markets are incomplete as we have in many developing countries, productivity on farm 
is highly dependent on supply of family labor which in turn depends on energy from food produced on the 
farm. If there is perfect market, farm households can increase farm labor input without reference to 
consumption decisions of household. The second theoretical explanation for this reverse causality is the 
efficiency wage hypothesis by Stigliz (1976). In this latter case, labor productivity and consequently wages 
are thought to depend on the level of health and nutrition of the job seeker.  So it is the calorie intake level 
of a non-landed farm worker that will determine whether he will be able to get a job and thus earn some 
wages at the going efficiency wage rate. 
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and Deaton (1996) ignored the possibility of reverse causation between calorie intake and 
income. They showed that in rural Maharashtra, south western India, it is implausible that 
income is constrained by nutrition because the cost of calories necessary for a day’s 
activities is less than 5% of the daily wage.  In the study area, the cost of calories 
necessary to satisfy the FAO minimum daily standard of 2500 kilocalorie is as much as 
91 percent of the per-capita expenditure per day. If we follow the reasoning of 
Subramanian and Deaton (1996), it is plausible to think that income may be substantially 
constrained by nutrition in rural south western Nigeria.35 Consequently we should expect 
an upward bias in the OLS estimate of α1 and α2 due to the violation of underlying 
assumptions of the OLS estimator. 
Furthermore, per-capita expenditure is endogenous since the decision to expend is 
taken side by side with the decision to consume calories or purchase food items. This 
implies a correlation between X and ε, and introduces omitted variable bias. These 
potential problems of endogeneity of income due to omitted variable bias would result in 
a biased OLS estimate of α1 and α2.  It is however difficult to determine the direction of 
this bias apriori.  
Another potential source of bias in the OLS estimates of per capita expenditure 
and women income share coefficients in this investigation is the classical measurement 
error bias which is also referred to as attenuation bias. The presence of measurement 
error in the information collected on income and expenditure would result in a downward 
bias of the OLS estimate. Given the usual difficulty in getting accurate information on 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
35 The cost of 2500 kilocalories in the study area is 70.00 Naira and the average daily per capita expenditure 
is 77.00 Naira (This is about $1.00 at the time of data collection in 1999).  
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income and expenditure of individuals and households in developing countries, 
measurement error bias may be a very important source of bias in this study.   
Attempts made in this study to reduce the effect of these potential sources of bias 
on the estimate of per capita expenditure and women’s income share elasticity can be 
categorized into two. First are measures taken at the data collection stage, and second are 
measures taken at the estimation stage. Figures on food intake, income and expenditure 
used in the analysis are averages of data collected through multiple visits over a period of 
six months. This is expected to reduce classical measurement error since we use the mean 
of the distribution of quantities/values for each respondent over a period of time. Second, 
data on calorie intake was obtained directly from food quantity data and not indirectly 
from food expenditure data. This reduces the potential upward bias from non-classical 
measurement errors.36   Third, values of time varying and time invariant assets of the 
household and individuals were collected at the beginning and end of the survey. The 
average values were used in the analysis.  
The instrumental variable two stage least square (2SLS) estimation procedure is 
used to address the problems relating to measurement error bias, simultaneity and 
endogeneity of income/expenditure. With this procedure, expression 6.1 is estimated in 
place of expression 5.1. 
C = β0 + β1 X* + β2 W* + β3 I + β4H + β5 P + ε*   (6.1) 
 
Where  
                                                          
36 This non-classical measurement error is created if calorie intake quantity is computed from food 
expenditure data. In such cases, any measurement error in the expenditure on the right hand side is carried 
on to the calorie intake value on the left hand side. As a result the estimated coefficient of per-capita 
expenditure   would potentially have an upward bias.  
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 X* and W* are predicted values of the two endogenous explanatory variables and 
ε* is an error term that is uncorrelated with X* and W*.  To obtain X* W* and ε*, 
expressions 6.2 and 6.3, called first stage regression equations are estimated. 
X = δ0 + δ1 I + δ2 H + δ3 P + δ4 Z + µ       (6.2) 
Ws = Φ0 + Φ1 I + Φ2 H + Φ3 P + Φ4 Z + υ       (6.3) 
Where I, H, and P are as defined in expression 5.1 and Z is the 1xK vector of 
identifying instruments.  Both µ and υ are assumed to be well behaved (i.e. independently 
and identically distributed, i.i.d.) with mean zero and constant variance, and X* = X – µ, 
while W* = W – υ.  
For the set of instruments used in this study to be valid, δ4 and Φ4 would have to 
be identified. That is the following conditions must hold for each equation.  
 E( Z  X) ≠  0 ; E( Z  W) ≠  0;        (6.4) 
E (C Z / X, W) = 0         (6.5), 
Where E represents mathematical expectations. 
Thus for an instrument to be valid it must be strongly correlated with per capita 
expenditure, X, or women’s income share, W (expression 6.4) and should not be 
significantly correlated with per capita daily calorie intake when conditioned on per 
capital expenditure and women income share (expression 6.5). That is, after controlling 
for X and W, the effect of the Z-vector of instruments on per capita calorie intake should 
be close to zero.  
Four such variables where found and used as instruments for per capita 
expenditure and women’s income share in this study.37 These variables are total value of 
                                                          
37 The first task in the estimation was to find strong predictors for the endogenous variables on the right 
hand side of the specified calorie intake. 4 significant predictors were selected after for both log per capita 
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all household’s assets38, the couple’s total number of years of schooling39, ratio of the 
years of schooling of senior woman to the household head, and the share of household 
business asset controlled by women. 40 
Theoretically both total value of assets and total number of years of schooling is 
expected to be a fair indicator of the income earning capacity of the household. That is 
we expect per capita consumption expenditure to increase as households become 
wealthier in terms of farm and non-farm business asset ownership. Holding the total 
value of assets constant, it is expected that increases in women’s share of household 
assets would increase per-capita consumption expenditure. Women’s income share is 
expected to be predicted by women share of household business asset and the ratio of 
women’s years of schooling to that of the household head.  That is, as women get control 
over more business assets relative to men in the household, we expect their share of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
income and women’s share of income after running a series regressions.  These are sum of years of 
schooling of husband and wife, ratio of wife’s years of schooling to husband’s years of schooling, total 
value household asset, women’s share of household’s business asset.   
 
38 The total value of all household assets is the sum of the value of all business and non-business assets 
owned by the household.  This includes land, farm implements, farm buildings, farm machinery, non-farm 
business machines and equipments. This estimate does not include farm supplies like fertilizer, seeds 
chemicals etc or inventories. 
 
39 This is the sum of years of education of husband and senior wife.  
  
40 Hopkins et al (1994), instrumented annual male income with the following variables:  land area operated 
by males, the value of male livestock assets, a dummy variable for male literacy, the number of wives, the 
dependency ratio, a variable for single or multiple conjugal units within the household, the age of the 
household head, quadratics of several variables and interaction terms.  The annual female income was 
instrumented using the land area operated by female, the value of female livestock assets, a dummy 
variable for female literacy, the number of infants in the household, the number of caretakers in the 
household (girls between the ages of ten and fifteen), a market village dummy, an ethnicity dummy, 
quadratics of several variables, and interaction terms. The instruments that were used to predict the log of 
per capita expenditure in Hoddinott and Haddad (1995) and Haddad and Hoddinott (1994) include: the 
amount of land owned by the household, the logarithm of the per capital value of holdings of consumer 
durable, the number of rooms per capita in the dwelling, the per capita floor area of the dwelling, and 
dummy variables equaling one; if the walls of the dwelling are cement, stone or brick; if the floor of the 
dwelling is cement, stone or brick; if the dwelling is owned by the household and is located in an urban 
cluster; if the household grows any major internationally traded cash crop.   
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household income to rise. Also, a decline in the schooling gap between household men 
and women is expected to lead to an increase in the share of household income under the 
control of women.  
An important condition for the identification of δ4 and Φ4 in this study is that the 
amount of assets owned by the households, total years of schooling of couple, women’s 
share of household business asset, and ratio of wife to husband years of schooling would 
only affect calorie intake indirectly through their (direct) effect on per capita expenditure 
and women’s share of income. If this additional condition is satisfied, then these four 
variables would be acceptable as satisfactory identifying instruments for per capita 
income and women’s share of income in the calorie intake model.   
7.0  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
7.1 Ordinary Least Square Estimates of Expenditure and Women’s Income Share 
Elasticities 
Results presented in the first row of the first panel of Table 11 shows a 
significant41 ordinary least square (OLS) estimate of per-capita expenditure elasticity of 
calorie intake between 0.7 and 3.8 percent. This estimate supports the empirical school 
which argues that the response of calorie intake to marginal changes in income is close to 
zero (Wolfe and Behrman, 1983, Behrman and Deolalikar, 1987).  
The OLS result presented in the third column of Table 9 suggests that expenditure 
elasticity of calorie intake is inversely related to income levels. That is calorie intake is 
                                                          
41 The standard errors of the estimated coefficients were corrected for clustering within households by 
using the robust cluster command in STATA software package. The reason is that the simple estimates of 
standard errors become incorrect when we have multiple observations, which are not independent within a 
data. In the data set used for this analysis most of the income and expenditure variables, as well as 
household head and senior wife characteristics fall into this category of variables. All individuals that 
 26
likely to respond more to marginal income changes in households located at the lower 
percentile of income distribution compared with households located at the higher 
percentile. This result is fairly common in empirical literature (Behrman and Wolfe, 
1984; Strauss, 1986) although some studies have also found that the log-linear model fits 
the calorie intake-expenditure data more satisfactorily (Ward and Sanders 1980, Wolfe 
and Behrman, 1983).  
We observe from the first panel and first row of Table 11 that a 10 percent 
increase in women’s share of household income would result in the lowering of per-
capita daily calorie intake by between 0.15 and 0.19 percent. Even though this negative 
effect is small, it is an indication that redistribution of household income from husband to 
wife may not be an effective strategy for motivating increasing intake of food calories by 
low income rural households in south western Nigeria.  
In addition, we observe an insignificant difference between the women’s income 
share elasticity estimate from the log-linear expenditure and the non-linear expenditure 
calorie intake models. This is an evidence of the robustness of the women share of 
income estimate.  
 
7.2 Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) Estimates of Expenditure and Women’s  
Income Share Elasticities 
As earlier discussed, ordinary least squares estimates of calorie-income and 
calorie-women’s income share elasticity are likely to be biased if per-capita expenditure 
and income share are endogenous to the calorie intake model.  If this assumption of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
belong to the same household have the same values for these variables. This is referred to as clustering 
within households 
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endogeneity of income and expenditure is true, then we would expect that the true 
elasticity estimates should be significantly smaller or larger than what the OLS estimate 
suggests. On the other hand, if measurement error is considered as a likely dominant 
source of bias, then the resulting attenuation bias would imply that the true elasticity 
estimates should be higher than what the OLS estimates suggest.   
The proposed way of addressing these problems is to use an instrumental variable 
(IV) estimator to estimate the coefficients of per-capita expenditure and women’s income 
share through a 2SLS procedure. I approach this by first running a first stage regression 
to generate reduced form estimates of the endogenous right hand side variables; to show 
how well the complete  set of  instruments predict the endogenous right hand side 
variables of the structural model; and to test for the joint significance of the set of 
identifying instruments. I then run a second stage regression using all the right hand side 
variables in the OLS results discussed above but replacing the observed values of per-
capita expenditure and women’s share of income with the predicted values from the first 
stage regression. The results are presented below.  
7.2.1    First Stage Regression Results  
The results of the first stage regressions for log per-capita expenditure, quadratic of log 
per capita expenditure and women’s share of household income are reported in Table 7. 
We observe from the F-test results that all the 3 estimated reduced form equations are 
statistically significant at 0.000 α-level (see columns 1, 3 & 5 of Table 7). Furthermore, 
the set of identifying instruments is able to predict 4.5 percent of the variations in log per-
capita expenditure, 4.6 percent of variations in the quadratic term of log per-capita 
expenditure and 23.0 percent of variations in women’s income share ( see columns 2,4 & 
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6 of Table 7). As expected, we observe that the couple’s total years of schooling and the 
value of all assets owned by household are significant predictors of log per capita 
expenditure. After controlling for these two identifying instruments as well as 
wife/husband years of schooling ratio, women’s share of household business assets  has 
no significant effect on log per capita expenditure, while its effect on women’s share of 
income was statistically significant at less than 0.00 percent α-level.42 Women’s share of 
household business asset turns out to be the main identifying instrumental variable for 
women share of income. That is, after controlling for other model variables, the higher 
the proportion of household business assets that belong to women, the higher the 
proportion of the household income that is under the control of women.    
7.2.2 Second Stage Regression Results and Discussion  
The first row of the second panel on Table 11 presents the expenditure and 
women’s income share elasticity estimates derived from the 2SLS estimation results 
reported in the second panel of Table 9.43 
Generally, we find consistency in the sign attached to the estimated coefficient of 
per capita expenditure and women’s income share variables irrespective of the type of 
estimator (i.e. OLS or 2SLS) or the assumptions about the behavior of expenditure 
elasticity vis-à-vis household income level.    
                                                          
42 Women’s share of household income is significantly predicted by all four identifying instrumental 
variables namely total years of schooling of husband and wife, total value of household assets, 
wife/husband ratio of years of schooling, and women’s share of household business asset. 
43We also observe from Table 9 that individual daily calorie intake is dependent on age of individual with a 
quadratic form of relationship. Older individuals have higher intakes Calorie intake increases by 2.7 
percent from age 2 to 3 and increases at a decreasing rate on till the age of 54.5 years when a decline sets 
in.  The calorie intake level of the farming households is not significantly different from non-farming 
households.  Thus, the occupational status of the household does not exact a significant influence on the 
level of calorie intake.  Finally, males generally had about 4 percent more calorie intakes than females. 
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Per capita expenditure elasticity of calorie intake is estimated to be 3.0 percent 
under the linear expenditure model and 0.1 percent under the non-linear expenditure 
model.  Theoretically, it is expected that income44 increases would enable individuals in 
low income households to increase their food calorie intake. This in turn is expected to 
improve nutrition status, health and productivity of household members. The observed 
low calorie intake elasticity suggests that calorie intake does not get a substantial share of 
marginal increases in household income. This result is in line with the conclusion of 
Bouis and Haddad (1992) that most recent studies have reported calorie-income elasticity 
which are less than 0.2 in contrast to conventional wisdom that calorie-income elasticity 
for low income populations in the developing world ranges between 0.4 and 0.8. Thus, 
increasing household income may not be a very effective strategy for bringing about 
increased food energy intake among low income households in south western Nigeria.45  
                                                          
44 Income is proxied here by consumption expenditure. Consumption expenditure is widely used in place of 
income because of a number of reasons. One is that it is subject to less errors of measurement and second is 
that it is a better approximation of permanent income, if we assume that households smooth consumption 
over their life time.  
 
45 Ravallion (1990) argues that the low calorie income elasticity estimates in literature is counterintuitive 
and is likely to be the result of data imperfections. He further argues that if this low estimates were a true 
reflection of reality; it still does not support a conclusion that income increment is not a good policy 
strategy for reducing under-nutrition. According to him, if we think in terms of head count index of under 
nutrition, the marginal effect of a change in income of undernourished households on a headcount index of 
under-nutrition is determined by the product of the calorie income elasticity and the slope of the 
distribution function of intake. If the distribution function is very steep ( ie a large proportion of the 
population are just above nutritional adequacy level), a small drop in intake resulting from income changes 
may move a large proportion of the people below the minimum nutrient intake line. So to assess the impact 
of income on under-nutrition, we must know the distribution of nutrient intake of the population. That is, 
we need to know the proportion of households that are close to the minimum nutrient intake line. The more 
households that are near to this line the more important is income increments in achieving improvements in 
under-nutrition. He argues that there is a clear difference between the concepts of nutrient intake (which 
most empirical literature has measured income effect for) and under-nutrition (which involves other factors 
such as minimum requirement and household and personal characteristics.   His major goal in this study are 
to estimate calorie income elasticity and then use the elasticity estimates to simulate the effects of income 
changes on various measures of caloric under-nutrition such as head count nutrition index, nutrition 
deficiency depth index and nutrition deficiency severity index all based on FGT poverty index.  
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These 2SLS expenditure elasticity estimates are larger than the OLS estimates and  
are not statistically significant due to larger standard errors.46   In addition, we observe 
that the 2SLS of the  quadratic term of the log per-capita expenditure variable is not 
statistically significant.47 
Women’s share of income elasticity estimate is negative and between 3.63 and 
5.10 percent, depending on the assumption about the behaviour of per capita expenditure 
elasticity as income level increases. Contrary to what we find in the case of per capita 
expenditure, these estimates are higher in absolute terms than the corresponding OLS 
estimates reported earlier. This may be an indication that classical measurement error 
bias is an important source of bias in this investigation since we were unable to 
empirically confirm the endogeneity of women’s share of income in this study (see 
section 7.3.2 for discussion on the test of endogeneity).48 Both estimates of women’s 
share of income elasticity are statistically significant at 5 percent α-level. Thus, a 
doubling of the share of household income controlled by women from the current average 
of 0.31 to 0.62 will result in a 3.6-5.1 percent decline in per capita calorie intake of the 
household from the current average of 2204 kilocalories. 
                                                          
46 The 2SLS estimator is a less efficient estimator compared with the OLS even though the former is more 
consistent.  
 
47 This statistical insignificance of the quadratic term in the 2SLS estimation in spite of its significance in 
the OLS estimation may be due to a number of things. First, the assumption may not be true in the 
population that the income elasticity varies with income levels of households. Second, the data may consist 
of only households within the same response bracket. Third, the quadratic term of the expenditure variable 
is not adequately identified. I would think the available evidence supports the third explanation. Table 7 
shows that the linear and quadratic terms of the per-capita expenditure variable are not adequately 
identified. That is there is none of the four identifying instruments that identifies the linear term separately 
from the quadratic term.  
 
48 Thus even though the use of 2SLS may have resulted in the inability to reject the null hypothesis of zero 
effect of expenditure on calorie intake due to larger standard error estimates compared with OLS, the 
higher estimates of elasticity coefficients would suggest that using the 2SLS approach could have at least 
achieved significant reductions in the effect of classical measurement error bias on elasticity estimates. 
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 As implied by the OLS estimates, the 2SLS estimates clearly reject the 
hypothesis that per capita calorie intake responds positively to increasing women’s share 
of household income, and suggests that income redistribution from men to women would 
not increase per capita food energy intake in this population.  
However, it can be argued that the observed non-positive response of per capita 
calorie intake to changes in women’s share of household income may be evidence of 
female preference for more expensive foods with less energy content. To check this, I 
estimate the effect of women’s share of income on food calorie price.49 The elasticity 
estimates as presented in the second row of the first and second panels of Table 11, show 
that the unit cost of calorie consumed does not vary positively with changes in women’s 
share of income, suggesting that women do not seem to reallocate expenditures towards 
more expensive calorie sources as their income share increase. 
Another plausible explanation for the negative sign of the women’s income share 
coefficient is the issue of transaction costs. Since the estimate of the effect of women’s 
share of income conditions on household income, increasing women’s share of income 
would, by definition, be associated with decreasing share for men. Even if household 
resources are not reallocated to more expensive foods with less calorie content, calorie 
intake could still decline if it is more expensive to get a unit of calorie with women’s 
income (largely from non-farm business) than with men’s income. Consequently, the 
household will expend more to consume the same quantity and quality of food if income 
                                                          
49 Food calorie price here is a proxy for how expensive the calorie being taken is. A higher value of food 
calorie price/cost implies higher quality calorie source. It is computed as the ratio of per capita food 
expenditure to per capita food calorie intake. i.e. calorie price (Naira/kcals) = per capita food expenditure 
(Naira) / per capita calorie intake (kcals) A significant and positive coefficient of women share of income 




is redistributed from men to women. The notion of transaction cost here refers to the 
difference between the price of a food bundle obtained from the husband’s largely 
agricultural income and the cost of the same bundle of food obtained from the woman’s 
largely non-farm business income. This situation can arise if food consumption from 
men’s income is mainly from his farm and food consumption from female income is 
mainly from the non-farm business activities.50 
 To check if it is the case in the study area that food consumption from women’s 
income comes more from the non-farm sources relative to food consumption from men’s 
income, I estimate an equation whose dependent variable is the share of purchased food 
in total food expenditure and the right hand side variables are the same as the calorie 
intake equation in expression 6.1. A positive and significant coefficient of women’s share 
of income in this equation would suggest that households purchase more of their food 
from the market as women’s income share increases.  
This however does not guarantee that the same quality and quantity of food is 
obtained at higher cost in the market. To check this, I estimate an equation with log per 
capita food expenditure as the dependent variable and the same right hand side variables 
as the three previous equations. A significant and positive women’s share of income 
coefficient would suggest that intra-household income redistribution to women would 
make the households spend more per capita on food. 
A positive sign for women’s share of income in both equations would suggest that 
the negative sign on the calorie intake equation coefficient may be due to transaction 
costs. Otherwise, we would not have enough evidence to infer transaction cost as the 
                                                          
50 It is assumed here that the same quality and quantity of food purchased in the market would cost more 
than if obtained from own farm due to positive marketing margins/markups. 
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cause of the negative sign of the women’s income share coefficient in the calorie intake 
equation. 
Row 3 in the first and second panels of Table 11 show the elasticity estimates for 
the share market food purchase in total household food expenditure, while row 4 of the 
two panels reports the elasticities for the per capita food expenditure equation. The 
women share of income elasticity estimate for the share of food purchases in total food 
expenditure is significant and positive, while that for the log of per capita  food 
expenditure is negative, implying that transaction cost would not be a sufficient 
explanation for the negative sign on the women’s share of income coefficient in the 
calorie intake equation.51 
Thus, the negative sign on the women’s share of income coefficient is more likely 
to be an indication that food calorie intake would respond negatively to a reallocation of 
household income from men to women, rather than a consequence of a reallocation of 
income towards more expensive and lower calorie foods or evidence of positive 
transaction cost in substituting female for male income to obtain household food 
consumption. Thus, more income in the hands of women relative to men would not 
increase calorie intake of household members in the study area. 
7.3.2 Endogeneity and Over-identification Tests 
One of the major reasons for the use of 2SLS in this study is the assumed 
endogeneity of per-capita expenditure and women’s share of income in the calorie intake 
                                                          
51 Elasticity for women’s share of income in the calorie intake, calorie price and food expenditure equations 
are calculated as the product of the estimated coefficient and the mean value of women’s share of income 
in the sample (0.31).  Income Elasticity for the share of food purchased from market is calculated as the 
ratio of the estimated coefficient to the mean value of log per capita expenditure, the women’s share of 
income elasticity is computed as the product of the estimated coefficient and the mean value of women’s 
share of income, divided by the mean value of market purchased share of food expenditure 
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model. To test whether these two right hand side variables are truly endogenous I execute 
a regression based test of endogeneity (Wooldridge, 2003). The residuals from the OLS 
estimated log per capita calorie intake structural  model are regressed on the residuals 
from the reduced form first stage regressions of individual right hand side endogenous 
variables on the complete set of controls and instruments. The result which is reported in 
Table 8 fails to reject the null hypothesis that per-capita expenditure and women’s share 
of income are exogenous to this model. The p-value for the joint F-test shows that the 
null hypothesis can only be rejected at an α-level as high as 67 percent. The implication 
of this is that both per-capita expenditure and women’s share of income can be taken as 
exogenous to this model given the sample52 and suggests that the OLS estimates is a 
consistent estimate of the coefficients of per-capita expenditure and women’s share of 
income.  
Secondly, since the set of identifying instruments used in this study contains four 
elements while the set of endogenous right hand side variables contain just 2 or 3 
elements (depending on the assumptions of the linear or quadratic response of per-capita 
income elasticity), we have a case of over-identification.  To test for the validity of this 
over-identifying restriction, I follow the regression based standard testing procedure 
(Wooldridge, 2003).  I regress the residual from the 2SLS estimate of per-capita calorie 
intake on the complete set of instruments and test for the joint significance of the four 
                                                          
52  The Hausman test for exogeneity of endogenous variables was also carried out. The test was aimed at 
finding out whether there is sufficient difference between the coefficients of the instrumental variable two 
stage least square regression (IV-2SLS) and the standard ordinary least square regression (OLS), to indicate 
that OLS would be inconsistent for our model. The results showed that we do not have sufficient statistical 
grounds to reject the null hypothesis that  “differences between coefficients of the OLS and the 
instrumental variables regression estimates are not systematic”. The implication is that OLS is also a 
consistent coefficient estimator for the estimated equations. However the estimated coefficients of the 
endogenous variables (women share of household income, per capita income, and per capita expenditure 
were consistently larger in the 2SLS compared with the direct OLS. 
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identifying instruments.53  The result as reported in the last column of Table 3 indicates a 
rejection of the null hypothesis which states that the over-identifying restrictions are 
valid. The chi square calculated is 33.28 and is larger than that the critical value of 5.99. 
Thus at least one of the instruments in not sufficiently exogenous to the calorie intake 
equation and is thus not a satisfactory identifying variable.  
In spite of the failure to empirically confirm the endogeneity of per-capita income 
and women share of income in this study, the use of 2SLS is still justified based on two 
arguments. First, there exist a theoretical basis for assuming that reverse causality 
between calorie intake and measures of income and income distribution. Second, data 
collection on income and expenditure in developing countries is subject to higher levels 
of measurement error and the IV estimator is an effective way to reduce the bias that this 
type of error may introduce into the estimation of income and expenditure elasticities. 54 
This later argument is supported by the finding that the 2SLS estimates of the coefficients 
of women’s share of income are consistently higher than the corresponding OLS 
estimates.  
8.0 CONCLUSION 
This study investigates how per capita calorie intake in low income households of 
rural south western Nigeria responds to changes in total household income and women’s 
share of household income. I utilize data collected with multiple visits over a period of 
                                                          
53 The null hypothesis in this case is that the coefficients of the set of 4 identifying instruments are not 
jointly significant. If the set of identifying instruments do not directly predict variations in  the calorie 
intake other than indirectly through its effects on income, the over-identification test accepts the added IV 
restrictions. 
54 Thus even though the use of 2SLS may have resulted in the inability to reject the null hypothesis of zero 
effect of expenditure on calorie intake due to larger standard error estimates compared with OLS, the 
higher estimates of elasticity coefficients for women’s share of income would suggest that using the 2SLS 
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six months from 2573 individuals in 480 randomly selected households. The study 
addresses two major questions. First, is calorie-income elasticity large enough to justify 
the use of income increases as a good food/nutrition policy strategy for increasing calorie 
intake among low income households?  Second, holding household income constant, in 
what way and to what extent is intra-household redistribution of income from men to 
women likely to increase per capita calorie intake of household members?  
The results of the study show that per capita expenditure elasticity of calorie 
intake is positive and less than 0.04, while the elasticity of calorie intake with respect to 
changes in women’s share of household income is negative and lies between 0.02-0.05. I 
showed that the negative effect of women’s income share on calorie intake of household 
members cannot be said to be due to a higher cost of obtaining same quantity/quality of 
food from women’s predominantly off-farm income and men’s predominantly farm 
income (called transaction cost in this paper). I also show that the estimated negative 
effect of increasing women’s share of income on calorie intake is not the consequence of 
reallocation of women’s income from low quality/high calorie foods to high quality/low 
calorie foods. 
The findings of the study support the following major conclusions. 
First, the response of calorie intake to increases in household income is small and 
close to zero, implying that income policies may not be the most effective way to achieve 
substantial improvements in calorie intake levels in the study area.  
Second, increases in women’s share of household income are likely to result in 
marginal declines in food calorie intake by individual household members. This result 
                                                                                                                                                                             
approach could have at least achieved significant reductions in the effect of classical measurement error 
bias  on elasticity estimates. 
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does not support the general thinking that intra-household resource reallocation from men 
to women would increase food energy intake. Rather it would imply that food calorie 
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Table 1: Summary of Sample Design  





















Egbado North Aiyetoro 40 207 40 191 
Obafemi Owode Owode 40 194 39 175 
Remo North Isara 40 211 39 171 
OGUN 
Ijebu East Ogbere 40 202 40 187 
Irele Irele 40 348 38 196 
Ondo East Bolorunduro 40 254 36 206 




Oke-Agbe 40 236 40 230 
Ibarapa North Ayete 40 278 40 250 
Itesiwaju Otu 40 322 40 309 
Surulere Iresa 40 241 40 226 
OYO 
Saki East Ago Amadu 40 201 40 204 
Total   480 2923 472 2573 
Source: Aromolaran (2001). 
Table 2:  Percentage Contribution to Calorie Intake by Sex of Individual Household 
Members 
Food group Group Members Percentage Contribution to Calorie Intake 
  Male  Female  
Roots Eba, fufu, Amala Lafun, Gari 40.29 40.91 
Tubers Yam, Pounded Yam, Elubo-
Isu, Potatoes, Porridge 
16.86 17.22 
Cereals Rice, Ogi/Eko/Custard, Maize 
Bread (Wheat) Biscuits   
17.36 17.39 
Legumes Beans, Moinmoin, Akara 7.48 7.56 
Vegetable Vegetables (Ewedu), Okro, 
Melon. 
2.89 2.97 
Beverage Tea, Coffee, Bournvita/Milo, 
Sugar.  
0.69 0.63 
Fruits Pawpaw, Orange Banana 1.35 1.41 
Oils and fat Palm Oil, Vegetable oil, 
Butter 
10.71 9.56 
Meat Pork, Sheep/Goat Meat, 
Cowskin, Chicken, Games 
(Bush Meat) 
0.80 0.79 
Fish Fish  1.18 1.20 
Other Animal 
Products 
Milk, Eggs 0.39 0.36 
Source: Field Survey, September 1999 – April 2000  
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Table 3: Percentage Contribution to Calorie Intake by Age Group of Individual Household 
Members 
 Age Groups ( years) 
 < 6 6-10 11-18 19-59 > 60 
Food Groupings      
Roots 44.45 41.80 37.65 36.15 31.33 
Tubers 15.44 16.81 17.23 17.08 18.53 
Cereals 16.84 15.62 16.42 18.49 17.38 
Legumes 6.51 6.79 7.35 7.64 6.77 
Vegetable 3.05 2.73 3.13 2.94 2.58 
Beverage 0.33 0.48 0.60 0.80 0.75 
Fruits 1.70 1.30 1.12 1.35 1.97 
Oils and fact 8.02 10.36 11.09 9.38 13.47 
Meat 0.64 0.56 0.71 0.91 0.98 
Fish 1.53 1.13 0.84 1.29 1.31 
Other Animal products 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.40 0.53 
Source: Field Survey, September 1999 – April 2000  
 
 
Table 4: Estimates of Per Capita Daily Energy Intake by Sex and Age of Individuals 
Sex/Age  No of Respondents Standard 
Minimum 
Requirement  (or 
RDA) 
Actual Intake % of Satisfaction 
Male     
Less than 6 122 1473 1298 88.1 
6 – 10 178 1970 1696 86.1 
11- 18 300 2488 2105 84.6 
 19 – 59 513 2550 2569 100.7 
60 and above 143 2355 2853 121.5 
     
Female     
Less than 6 125 1355 1373 101.3 
6 –10 190 1740 1671 96.0 
11 –18 261 1978 1947 98.4 
19 –59 658 1920 2515 130.9 
60 and above 81 1900 2430 127.9 
Source: Field Survey, September 1999 – April 2000  
* RDA is recommended daily allowance. This is the amount required to maintain regular 
body functioning and engage in required minimum activity related to good health and 
hygiene. Additional energy intake would be required to carry out productive activities 
such as farm labor supply. Source: FAO/WHO/UNU (1985) 
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Table 5:  Per Capita Calorie Intake by Education and Occupation of Household 
Head 
A: Per Capita Calorie Intake by Age of Individual and   Education level of Household 
Head 











Below Secondary School     
Less than 6 140 1415.25 1385 97.86 
6 – 10 255 1855 1732 93.40 
11 – 18 410 2232.5 2019 90.44 
19 – 59 818 2232 2568 114.90 
60  and above 204 2070 2710 130.92 
Secondary School & Above     
Less than 6 107 1415.25 1275 89.88 
6 – 10 143 1855 1607 86.63 
11 – 18 151 2232.5 2066 92.54 
19 – 59 353 2235 2471 110.56 
60 and above 20 2070 2603 125.75 
B: Per Capita Calorie Intake by Age of Individual  and Occupation of Household Head 
Food Sector     
Less than 6 118 1415.25 1423 100.55 
6 –10 187 1855 1785 96.23 
11 – 18 358 2232.5 2106 94.29 
19 – 59 670 2235 2619 117.18 
60 and above  168 2070 2721 131.45 
Non- food sector     
Less than 6 128 1415.25 1261 89.10 
6 –10 180 1855 1583 85.34 
11 – 18 200 2232.5 1900 85.11 
19 – 59 492 2235 2438 109.08 
60 and above  56 2070 2636 127.34 
Source: Field Survey, September 1999 – April 2000  
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Table 6: Description of Model Variables 
Variable  Mean  Std Deviation  
Left hand side endogenous variables    
Natural log of Individual daily calorie intake 7.591 0.486 
Natural log of Individual daily food expenditure  3.998    0.509 
Natural log calorie price  1.012 0.279 
Cash purchase share in total food expenditure (ratio) 0.574 0.327 
Right hand side endogenous variables   
Natural log of per capita consumption expenditure  7.291 0.901 
Women’s share of household income (ratio) 0.305 0.272 
Right hand side controls   
Age  26.7 19.4 
Number of wives  1.30 0.810 
Number of  female aged  in  household (60+)  0.170 0.450 
Number of male aged in household  0.350 0.550 
Number of female adults in household (19-59) 1.59 1.000 
Number of male adults in households (19-59) 1.26 1.23 
Number of  female adolescents in household ( 11-18 years )  0.690 1.000 
Number of   male adolescents in household ( 11-18 years ) 0.810 0.920 
Major occupation of household head  ( Non-Farming =1, Farming =0) 0.587 0.492 
Major occupation of senior wife ( Non-Farming =1, Farming =0) 0.703 0.457 
Yam price  ( N/kilogram)  13.0 7.46 
Cassava flour price( N/kilogram) 27.7 20.0 
Yam flour price ( N/kilogram) 60.3 34.7 
Cowpeas price  ( N/kilogram) 48.5 9.30 
Rice price  ( N/kilogram) 56.1 4.25 
Maize price  ( N/kilogram) 30.1 8.71 
Gari price  ( N/kilogram) 14.6 3.97 
Palm oil price  ( N/kilogram) 102.1 17.1 
Beef price ( N/kilogram) 249.3 138.1 
Fish price ( N/kilogram) 152.6 115.8 
Exclusion restrictions used to identify 2SLS    
Total Years of schooling of husband and wife 9.40 9.60 
Ratio of  senior wife’s to husband’s education 0.420 0.580 
Value  of total  assets of households in Naira value  ($1= 80 Naira) 810506.0 1941756.0 
Women’s share of total business asset (ratio) 0.304 0.341 
Other interesting variables not in final model    
 Individual  daily calorie intake   2204.0 969.0 
Unit cost of calorie intake ( Naira/100 kilocalories) 2.857 0.769 
Per capita consumption expenditure (N/month) 2135.0 1894.0 
Household size  ( no of persons) 7.11 3.26 
Value of  farm assets of households (Naira) 124533.0 269392.0 
Women’s share of farm size (ratio) 0.144 0.294 
Years of education of household head  5.08 5.43 
Years of education of senior wife 4.31 5.02 
Women’s share of household farmland value (ratio) 0.0703 0.180 
Women’s share of food expenditure (ratio ) 0.321 0.301 
Women’s food share in total women expenditure (ratio) 0.320 0.246 
Women’s share of home consumed farm produce. (ratio) 17.0 30.5 
Women’s share of value of crops on farm. (ratio) 11.1 26.8 
Source: field survey, August 1999-April 2000 
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F(4, N) 57.17 40.49 59.71 40.65 134.9 121.62  
Prob >F 56 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 R2 0.711 0.045 0.733 0.046 0.497 0.232 0.0141 
No of 
Observations 
2360 2360 2360 2360 2360 2360 2360 
nR2   ~    χ2       33.28 
χ2 (2, 0.05α-
level) 
      5.99 
* Figures in parenthesis are t-values and n is number of observation. 
 
                                                          
55 The 7th column is the regression-based test of validity of over-identifying restrictions. The dependent 
variable here is the residual from the 2SLS estimated log per capita calorie intake equation. The test 
statistic is computed as nR2 where n is number of observations, and this statistic is distributed chi-squared. 
The test rejects “Ho: over-identifying restrictions are valid”. Thus at least one of the instruments is not 
exogenous to the calorie intake equation. 
 
56 The p-value given here is for the joint significance of the four identifying instrumental variables. The list 
of control variables is as presented in Table 6. 
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Table 8: Results of Test of Endogeniety of Per-Capita Expenditure and 
Women’s Share of Income 
Dependent Variables57 Residuals from OLS Estimated Log Per-Capita Calorie Intake 
Equation 
 With log-linear Per-Capita 
Expenditure 
With Quadratic Per-Capita 
Expenditure 
Explanatory Variables    
Residual from first stage regression 





Residual from first stage regression 
of  per capita expenditure squared  
 0.000446 
(0.0.06) 
Residual from first stage regression 










Prob > F 58 0.665 0.782 
* * Figures in parenthesis are t-values. 
                                                          
57 The dependent variables are residuals from the OLS estimate of the full structural equation as presented 
in the second and fourth column of Table 9. 
 
58 The p-values of 0.665 and 0.782 imply an inability to reject the null hypothesis that per capita 
expenditure and women’s share of income are exogenous in this model. 
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Table 9: Results of Regression of Log Per Capita Daily Calorie Intake on Per Capita 
Expenditure and Women’s Share of Household Income. 
 Linear in Per-Capita Expenditure Quadratic in Per-Capita 
Expenditure 
Estimation Method   OLS IV- 2SLS OLS IV- 2SLS 
Log Per Capita Consumption 









Quadratic of Log Per Capita 
Consumption Expenditure    
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Household Head  Major Occupation  
 ( Non-Farming =1, Farming =0) 
0.0116    
(0.0159)      
0.0220   (0.0217)     .0231719   
.0155379           
0.0324   (0.0210)   
 Senior Wife Major Occupation  
( Non-Farming =1, Farming =0) 
0.0664  
( 0.0153)      
0.0694  
( 0.0171)   
  .0651072    
.015165      
(0.0640)   
(0.0180)      
Control for prices of seven most 
important staple food items (Yam, 
cassava flour, yam flour, cowpeas, 
rice, maize, gari, palm oil, and beef) 











R2 0.636  0.638  
Joint standard error estimate for 
linear & quadratic expenditure terms  
  0.0166 0.0136 
No of Observations 2360 2360 2360 2360 
* Figures in parenthesis are standard errors 
*Since the left hand side variables are individual observations, while a number of the right-hand side 
variables are observed at household level, we are faced with the problem of understating the standard error 
of the estimated coefficients due to cluster effects. We correct for this in all equations estimated in this 
paper by using robust standard error estimates (The Stata software package used for this analysis has a 
robust cluster command that  adjusts for cluster effects). 
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Table 10: Regression Results for Supplementary Models. 
A.                                                      OLS Ordinary Least Squares 
 Linear Per-Capita Expenditure Model  Quadratic Per-Capita Expenditure Model  


























Log Per Capita 
Consumption 













Quadratic of Log Per 
Capita Consumption 
Expenditure    






Women’s Share of 



























R2 0.603 0.683 0.579 0.604 0.685 0.579 
No of Observations 2360 2360 2360 2360 2360 2360 
Joint standard error 
estimate for linear & 
quadratic expenditure 
terms .  
   0.0100 0.0134 0.00954 
 
B.                           Instrumental Variables Two-Stage Least Squares ( 2SLS) 
 
 Linear Per-Capita Expenditure Model  Quadratic Per-Capita Expenditure Model  


























Log Per Capita 
Consumption 













Quadratic of Log Per 
Capita Consumption 
Expenditure    






Women’s Share of 



























No of Observations 2360 2360 2360 2360 2360 2360 
Joint standard error 
estimate for linear & 
quadratic expenditure 
terms  
   0.226 0.0793 0.0191 
*Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. 
*The complete set of controls in Table 9 is included in each equation. 
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TABLE 11:  Income Elasticity Estimates for Calorie Intake Quantity, Calorie Price, 
Market Purchased Share of Food Expenditure, and Food Expenditure. 
 
A .                                             Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
Linear Expenditure Model  Non-Linear Expenditure Model  
Log Per-Capita 
Expenditure   
 Women’s  
Share of  
Income   
Log Per-Capita 
Expenditure   
 Women’s  
Share of  
Income   
Dependent Variable     





































B.                                  Instrumental Variable Two Stage least Squares (2SLS) 
Log-Linear Expenditure Model     Non-Linear Expenditure Model    
Log Per-Capita 
Expenditure     
Women’s  
Share of  
Income    
Log Per-Capita 
Expenditure    
Women’s  
Share of  
Income   
Dependent Variable     







































*The complete set of controls in Table 9 is included in each equation. 
*Figures in parenthesis are standard errors. 
. 
                                                          
59 Since the expenditure elasticity coefficients in Table 11 (say Ê = f (ân)) are estimated at the mean value 
of per capita expenditure, X*, the applicable standard error estimate needed to evaluate statistical 
significance must be derived from the joint distribution of estimated linear (say â0) and quadratic terms (say 
â1) in the non-linear expenditure equations. These joint standard error estimates are reported in the last rows 
of the last 3 columns of panels A & B in Table 10. To compute these joint standard errors, I adopt the 
statistical concept called “Delta Method”, which is a lemma that allows us to test non-linear hypothesis 
given the asymptotic distribution of the estimator. ( see Hayashi (2000) for detailed description of the 
lemma). Deriving from the lemma,  if we assume that we have a set of 2-dimensional random vector ân= 
[â0  â1]  that converges in probability to  Φ and converges in distribution to Z; and suppose  that f (ân) is a 
function which has continuous first derivatives with g (ân) denoting the matrix of first derivatives, ie. 
[δf/δâ0  δf/δâ1]; then   f (ân) will converge in distribution to g(ân)Z . Thus, for the calorie intake non-linear 
expenditure elasticity coefficient, if   ân= [â0  â1]  converges in distribution to N ( 0, ∑ ), then  it must be the 
case that f (ân) = â0 + 2 â1X*  would converge in distribution to  N (0, g(ân) ∑  g(ân)' ). Where ∑  is the 
estimated variance-covariance matrix of  ân. and {g(ân) ∑  g(ân)' } is the variance of  f(ân)  given the joint 
distribution of the  â0 and  â1 . The standard error of f(ân) is just the square root of  the calculated variance. 
In this study,  f(ân) represents the various non-linear expenditure elasticities tabulated in Table 11. For the 
case of the double log functions, g (ân) =  [1, 2X*]  since  δf/δâ0 = 1 and   δf/δâ1 = 2X*. An adaptation of 
this concept was used to calculate all the standard error estimates reported in Table 11. 
